Over the last weekend, 9to5mac.com posted about a hack which shows that it’s possible to run Siri on a iPhone 4 and an iPod Touch 4g and possibly even oder devices - considering how much of Siri is running on Apple’s servers.
We’ve always suspected that the decision to restrict Siri to the 4S is basically a marketing decision and I don’t really care about this either. Nobody is forcing you to use Siri and thus nobody is forcing you to update to anything.
Siri is Apple’s product and so are the various iPhones. It’s their decision whom they want to sell what to.
What I find more interesting is that it was even possible to have a hacked Siri on a non 4S-phone talk to Apple’s servers. If I were in Apple’s shoes, I would have made that (practically) impossible.
And here’s how:
Having a device that you put into users hands and trusting it is always a very hard, if impossible thing to do as the device can (more or less) easily be tampered with.
So to solve this problem, we need some component that we know reasonably well to be safe from the user’s tampering and we need to find a way for that component to prove to the server that indeed the component is available and healthy.
I would do that using public key crypto and specialized hardware that works like a TPM. So that would be a chip that contains a private key embedded in hardware, likely not updatable. Also, that private key will never leave that device. There is no API to read it.
The only API the chip provides is either a relatively high-level API to sign an arbitrary binary blob or, more likely, a lower level one to encrypt some small input (a SHA1 hash for example) with the private key.
OK. Now we have that device (also, it’s likely that the iPhone already has something like that for its secured boot process). What’s next?
Next you make sure that the initial handshake with your servers requires that device. Have the server post a challenge to the phone. Have the phone solve it and have the response signed by that crypto device.
On your server, you will have the matching public key. If the signature checks out, you talk to the device. If not, you don’t.
Now, it is possible using very expensive hardware to extract that key from the hardware (by opening the chip’s casing and using a microscope and a lot of skills). If you are really concerned about this, give each device a unique private key. If a key gets compromised, blacklist it.
This greatly complicates the manufacturing process of course, so you might go ahead with just one private key per hardware type and hope that cracking the key will take longer than the lifetime of the hardware (which is very likely).
This isn’t at all specific to Siri of course. Whenever you have to trust a device that you put into consumers hands, this is the way to go and I’m sure we’ll be seeing more of this in the future (imagine the uses for copy protection - let’s hope we don’t end up there).
I’m not particularly happy that this is possible, but I’d rather talk about it than to hope that it’s never going to happen - it will and I’ll be pissed.
For now I’m just wondering why Apple wasn’t doing it to protect Siri.
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